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INTRODUCTION
While public debate over trade policy focuses on the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) trade agreement, another mammoth trade agreement is moving forward, more
quietly, between two of the three largest economies in the world: The United States
(US) and the European Union (EU). The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) aims to create the largest free trade zone in the world,
encompassing two huge economies that together comprise nearly half of the world's
gross domestic product.1
. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. While the views expressed herein are
those presented at the American Association of Law Schools panel in Jan. 2015, TTIP is a work in progress
and this article accordingly draws on sources that post-date that conference.
1 See SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43158, PROPOSED
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (T-TIP): IN BRIEF 3 (2014) [hereinafter CRS TTIP
Report].
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The two sides hope that TTIP will generate more than 200 billion dollars per year
2in benefits for producers and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. But the gains
being sought in this agreement are not the traditional sort, involving reductions in
classic tariffs, quotas, and other forms of protection. Rather, according to a recent
study commissioned by the EU, up to eighty percent of the economic gains forecast
for TTIP are expected to flow from transatlantic regulatory cooperation reducing
production costs and non-tariff barriers to trade.3
How can regulatory cooperation produce such savings? To take just one example:
US and EU automobile industry representatives claim that divergent safety regulations
between the two blocs require one hundred unique parts, forty-two million dollars in
additional development costs, duplicative testing of thirty-three vehicle systems, and
133 extra people in the manufacturing process. 4 According to a joint submission by
the US and EU automobile industries, these incompatible but substantively
equivalent sets of regulations are essentially imposing an ad valorem tariff of
twenty-six percent on producers and consumers.5 The industry estimates that
eliminating all actual tariffs plus just one-quarter of these regulatory, non-tariff trade
barriers would increase EU auto-related exports to the US by 149 percent, and increase
US auto-related exports to the EU by 347 percent. 6 Other industries such as specialty
toys, apparel, and footwear reported similar regulatory deadweight losses. TTIP
negotiators are examining regulatory trade barriers in nine different sectors. In each
sector, they are seeking ways to achieve cost (and price) savings for producers and
consumers through at least three distinct modes of regulatory cooperation. These
include:
(1) Harmonizing new regulations so that producers can design and manufacture
to a single standard;
(2) Recognizing each other's separate standards as mutually equivalent (where
they are, indeed, equivalent) so that meeting either standard will allow market
access; and
JOSEPH FRANCOIS, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, REDUCING TRANSATLANTIC BARRIERS TO
TRADE AND INVESTMENTS, at vii (2013).
'EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP: THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS EXPLAINED 6 (2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc 151787.pdf.
4 See CRS TTIP Report, supra note 1, at 8.
5 US. E.U. Automotive Regulatory Convergence, AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE POLICY COUNCIL &
EUROPEAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION (Apr. 10
11, 2013), at 8, https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/grc/AAPC-
ACEA%20Joint%20Presentation%20at%20Regulatory%20Cooperation%20Forum%20April%2011 ,%20
2013%20FINAL%20PDF.pdf.
6 Id. at9.
7 See CRS TTIP Report, supra note 1, at 8. See also Samuel Benka, Regulatory Convergence in the
TTIP: Facilitating Trade and Cooperation in the Transatlantic Region, AMERICA'S TRADE POLICY (June
10, 2014), http://americastradepolicy.com/regulatory-convergence-in-the-ttip-facilitating-trade-and-
cooperation-in-the-transatlantic-region/#.VaJoRrWyiAc.
[VOL 22.1
FOUR CHALLENGES
(3) Eliminating duplicative testing, inspection, and conformity assessment
procedures that impose pointless costs on regulators and regulated entities
alike.
8
While the goal is to eliminate unnecessary and costly trade barriers, negotiators
also recognize that such barriers have developed over decades. Regulators on each
side are loath to abandon long-standing custom and practices. Industries on both sides
have invested billions in designing products to satisfy two incompatible regulatory
specifications. TTIP talks will not fully eliminate these widespread and entrenched
inconsistencies, even in the nine sectors currently under active discussion, much less
in the many additional sectors that have generated requests for future regulatory
rationalization.
Recognizing this fact, TTIP delegates have adopted a three-pronged approach to
promoting transatlantic trade in the regulatory realm:
(1) The nine simultaneous sectoral negotiations mentioned above;
(2) Parallel discussions seeking commitments from each side to adopt specified
best practices for their domestic regulatory process (under the heading of
"regulatory coherence"); and
(3) Negotiations aimed at establishing a set of institutions and processes to guide
continued efforts at regulatory cooperation after TTIP is ratified (under the
heading of "regulatory cooperation"). 9
The ultimate goal is to unlock billions of dollars in savings while preserving
and perhaps enhancing health, safety, environmental, and financial protections. Of
course, this is a long-term goal, and achieving it will require a long-term effort.
Meanwhile, the short timeline for TTIP negotiations (negotiators hope to conclude
talks by the end of 2016) means that the third initiative identified above crafting a
"horizontal chapter" that sets forth a workable process for promoting regulatory
cooperation in the long run-is in many ways the most important.
This article thus addresses the major challenges facing negotiators of the
regulatory cooperation (horizontal) chapter of TTIP, and it offers recommendations
on how negotiators might address each challenge.
I. FOUR CHALLENGES FOR TTIP REGULATORY COOPERATION
The principal challenges facing TTIP negotiators in the field of international
regulatory cooperation (IRC) can be grouped into four broad categories. This section
will provide a concise overview of these challenges, which the next section will
address in detail.
Industry is dissatisfied that years of transatlantic regulatory dialogue have not
led more often to regulatory cooperation. Industry wants assurances that
See generally E. U Negotiating Texts, Chapter-by-Chapter: Part 2: Regulatory Cooperation, EUR.
COMM'N (May 4, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id 1230#regulatory-
cooperation.
9 See Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP, EUR. UNION, n. 7 (May 4, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc 153403.pdf.
2015]
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TTIP will bring real regulatory cooperation across a broad spectrum of
economic activity.10
* Public interest groups on both sides are concerned that the "regulatory
cooperation" process will be captured by industry and trade ministries, and
used to put downward pressure on regulatory protections. 1
* Public interest groups and regulators alike are worried that adding new
requirements for international consultation and "trade impact analysis" will
further burden and ossify the regulatory process.12
* The secrecy of the talks, particularly on the US side, has bred public
suspicion of negotiators and complicated their task of reaching an informed
consensus on both the substance and the process of cooperation.
13
A. The Challenge of Making Cooperation Happen (This Time)
History is seldom written on a clean slate. As Chase and Pelkmans have
documented, IRC dialogue between the US and EU has been ongoing for over twenty
years. 14 While these efforts have yielded significant progress in a few areas, including
a 2009 agreement on commercial aircraft airworthiness certifications and a 2012
agreement on mutual recognition of US and EU approaches to "organic" labeling,
regulatory cooperation efforts have fallen short of industry expectations in many
others. 15 A joint US-EU solicitation of comments that took place in 2012, in the run-
up to TTIP, yielded upwards of eighty (often quite specific) industry requests for
additional IRC efforts spanning a wide range of sectors. 16 Industry groups on both
sides of the Atlantic quite understandably want to see new institutions and processes
that will ensure that the past is not repeated, and that transatlantic regulatory
rationalization moves forward with purpose and effect.
0 See, e.g., PETER CHASE & JACQUES PELKNLANS, CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES & CTR. FOR
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, THIS TIME IT'S DIFFERENT: TURBO-CHARGING REGULATORY COOPERATION
IN TTIP (2015).
" See, e.g., Regulation None of Our Business?, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY (Dec. 26,
2013), http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2013/12/regulation-none-our-business [hereinafter CEO Report].
1 See, e.g., HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE, STATEMENT BY CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS
ON REGULATORY COOPERATION IN TTIP (2015), http://env-
health.org/IMG/pdf/statement regulatory cooperation feb 2015 1.pdf.
1 For a particularly articulate statement of this concern, see Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Free Trade
Disagreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/opinion/edsall-free-trade-
disagreement.html?r 0 (addressing secrecy in the more controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership, but
raising concerns that apply equally to TTIP).
14 CHASE & PELKMANS, supra note 10, Annex 1.
15 id.
16 CHASE & PELKMANS, supra note 10, at 6 8, Annex 1. The solicitation may be found at
http:/transatlanticrelations.org/content/ctr-articles. For the industry comments see, on the US side,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D USTR-2012-0028-0001, and on the EU side,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul id 160 (click on "Full versions of the
contributions").
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B. The Challenge of Finding the Right Balance Between Autonomy and
Coordination
Europe and the United States are by no means identical in their risk preferences
or regulatory risk management policies. Indeed, a leading comparative study of EU
and US risk preferences and regulatory regimes revealed a checkerboard pattern of
risk tolerance, in which the EU is more protective in some areas, the US in others.
17
However, the two sides also recognize that they are both democracies committed
to the rule of law and to rational regulation, and they do follow similar principles and
procedures in the drafting and implementation of regulation, even if those procedures
do not always lead to precisely the same result.1 8 Moreover, both sides are generally
committed to a high level of protection of health, safety, the environment, and
economic security. A key premise of TTIP, therefore, is that both sides should be able
to collaborate fruitfully to eliminate at least some costly and duplicative conformity
assessments (in cases where US and EU substantive protections diverge), and
hopefully to make their substantive requirements more similar over time. This would
reduce costs for producers and consumers without lowering regulatory standards. 
19
Civil society groups are not convinced, however. Even in areas where the two
sides maintain regulations of roughly equal stringency, civil society groups and large
swaths of the public (particularly in Europe) have expressed deep concerns that
"regulatory cooperation" may become, in practice, a source of downward pressure on
20health, safety, and environmental protections. Those critics see TTIP regulatory
17 Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe,
5 J. RISK RESEARCH 317, 322 (2002) ("Europe appears to be more precautionary than the US about such
risks as GMOs, hormones in beef, toxic substances, phthalates, climate change, guns, and
antitrust/competition policy. The US appears to be more precautionary than Europe about such risks as new
drug approval, the ban on CFCs in aerosol spray cans and the ban on supersonic transport to protect the
stratospheric ozone layer, nuclear energy, lead in gasoline, particulate air pollution, highway safety, teenage
drinking, cigarette smoking, mad cow disease in blood donations, potentially violent youths, 'right to know'
information disclosure requirements, and missile defences.")
1 See, e.g., UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HIGH-LEVEL REGULATORY COOPERATION
FORUM: COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON REGULATORY PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES (2011),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011 /july/tradoc 148030.pdf.
19 Cecilia Malmstr6m, TTIP: What Consumers Have to Gain, EUR. COMM'N (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/january/tradoc 154173.pdf ("In our conversations with the US
we recently heard an example of this with the US Food and Drug Administration. Today they spend just
under half of their resources for international cooperation on the EU. But the products they are most
concerned about in terms of dangers to US public health like poor quality medicine or medical devices come
from other countries. If they were able to trust the EU's own enforcement mechanisms they could redirect
resources to where it matters, making the US public safer. The same would apply to many other products
and certainly applies to our own resources here in Europe.").
" For example, 110 public health and environmental organizations in the EU and US object to the
inclusion of the chemicals sector in TTIP, raising the fear that "[s]tronger, more precautionary and
protective measures for carcinogens, hormone (endocrine) disruptors, and nanomaterials by the E.U. are all
targeted by USTR and the chemical industry as trade barriers." Nadia Prupis, Leaked TTIP Documents
Reveal Powerful Chemical Industry Wins, COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014/10/01 /leaked-ttip-documents-reveal-powerful-chemical-
industry-wins. Food safety groups are also concerned. Food and farm issues being negotiated under TTIP
include: genetically engineered crops, animal drugs and hormones, animal welfare, livestock
antibiotics, chemically washed poultry, and nanotechnology. Debbie Barker, international program director
at the US-based Center for Food Safety, worries: "Many people don't know that these secret negotiations
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
cooperation as a sort of Trojan horse for business interests to apply corporate and trade
pressure on regulators, both during the TTIP talks and afterwards when public
attention has died down. The goal of such pressure, civil society groups fear, would
be to harmonize US and EU standards around the lowest common denominator. This
might be done either directly or (more likely) by recognizing each other's different
standards as mutually equivalent and therefore interchangeable, thereby achieving the
same effect as downward harmonization in cases where levels of protection are
21declared equivalent but actually diverge.
The central challenge for TTIP, then, is to establish procedures that will
streamline regulatory compliance and promote the elimination of needless regulatory
barriers to trade, while providing solid assurance that such procedures and
mechanisms will not lead to weakened protections for health, safety, the environment
or financial security.
C. The Resource Challenge
US agencies already face a formidable array of analytic requirements that attach
to all significant new regulations, as well as growing requirements for the retrospective
22
review of existing regulations. Critics are concerned that these onerous and unfunded
mandates combined with increasingly searching and skeptical review by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) have already ossified agency regulation at the
23
expense of timely intervention to protect health, safety, or the environment. Rather
than ease this burden, TTIP negotiators are pondering proposals that would add to
agencies' analytical requirements. These proposed new requirements include
additional transatlantic consultations as well as "trade impact" or "regulatory
compatibility" assessments that have not been required as a regular matter to date. The
question arises, where will the resources for all of this extra effort come from?
D. The Transparency Challenge
Objections to the excessive secrecy on the US side compound concerns about the
substance and process of TTIP regulatory cooperation. A comparison of the European
Commission and United States Trade Representative (USTR) web pages relevant to
24TTIP tells a tale of vastly dissimilar approaches. On the EU website, negotiating
may undermine efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to protect our food, our health, and our environment."
Center for Food Safety Report Warns TTIP Could Undermine Critical Food Safety and Environmental
Regulations, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (May 14, 2014), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/press-
releases/3153/center-for-food-safety-report-warns-ttip-could-undermine-critical-food-safety-and-
environmental-regulations. See also HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE, supra note 12.
1 For a representative statement of the civil society position on the TTIP Regulatory Coherence
chapter, see CEO Report, supra note 11.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993).
See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "'Deossifying" The Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32397, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS (2009).
14 Compare In Focus: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, EUR. COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index en.htm, with Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP), OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https:Hustr.gov/ttip, and
Non-Tariff Barriers and Regulatory Issues, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
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positions and texts are put forward for each round of TTIP talks, along with
explanations, fact sheets, and position papers. These support the EU position on the
horizontal chapter as well as on each of the nine sectoral discussions underway in the
25IRC portion of the talks. The USTR website mentions virtually nothing relevant to
TTIP regulatory cooperation. This contrast is not an artifact of different webmasters;
rather, it is rooted in policy. The EU has made the decision to share its negotiating
texts with the public, but the USTR and OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) have elected to share their position and negotiating texts only with
"cleared advisors" who are themselves sworn to secrecy as a condition of their
access.26 Moreover, the cleared committees set up to advise USTR and OIRA in these
27talks tend to be industry-dominated. The result, critics claim, is skewed transparency
on the US side that privileges industry views and breeds resentment and suspicion
28
among public interest groups. Ultimately, listening sessions for public interest
groups offer only a semblance of meaningful public participation in decision-making.
Two main consequences, both negative, flow from this state of affairs. First,
excluding experts and knowledgeable stakeholders means that the US government
may not get the best advice on complex technical issues, or may receive it in a
piecemeal and inefficient format. Second, a policy of official secrecy means that
https:Hustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-t-
tip/t-tip-2. Note that all written comments on the IRC process submitted by members of the public are
archived online at http://www.regulations.gov/#!searchResults;rpp 25;po 0;s USTR-2012-0028. Notably
absent, however, is any (online) window into the thought process of US government regulators or
negotiators themselves.
15 The nine sectors covered in the TTIP IRC talks for which one finds fact sheets and position papers
on the EU website (but not the US website) are: chemicals, cosmetics, engineering, medical devices,
pesticides, information technology, textiles, and vehicles. See E. U Negotiating Texts, supra note 8 (at
"Specific Industries").
16 Interestingly, the EU began TTIP talks with the same posture on transparency as USTR, saying "we
don't share negotiating texts with the public." The EU, however, moved away from that position as the talks
progressed. The US did not. See Steve Suppan, The Struggle for Transparency in the U.S. -E. U. Trade Deal,
THINK FORWARD BLOG (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.iatp.org/blog/201311/the-struggle-for-transparency-in-
the-us-eu-trade-deal.
" For example, on the US side, much of USTR's advice from industry comes either from informal
one-on-one contacts or from Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACS), listed on the USTR website at
http://ita.doc.gov/itac/committees/index.asp. See Edsall, supra note 13. Inspection of the membership of
these committees reveals that they are not evenly balanced among interest groups and, in fact, most have
no public interest representation at all. According to a recent USTR Federal Register notice soliciting
nominations for ITAC membership: "Historically, the Secretary [of Commerce] and the USTR have
appointed a representative of the public health or health care community to each of ITACs 3 [Chemicals,
Pharmaceuticals, Health/Science Produces and Services] and 15 [Intellectual Property Rights], and an
environmental representative to each ofITACs 3 and 7 [Forest Products]. The Secretary and the USTR will
continue to consider nominations for representatives of such viewpoints to those ITACs." Request for
Nominations for the Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACS); Amendment, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,552,
51,554 (Aug. 29, 2014).
" See, e.g., Andrew Ranallo, Leaked Document Reveals US.-E. U Trade Agreement Threatens Public
Safety, INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY (July 24, 2014),
http://www.iatp.org/documents/leaked-document-reveals-us-eu-trade-agreement-threatens-public-health-
food-safety. The only truly public consultative process to be found in the US takes the form of USTR and
OIRA "listening sessions" with the public, who voice their aspirations for, and concerns about, TTIP. But,
the government does not respond in these sessions, which starkly limits their usefulness. See James Love,
USTR "'Listening Session "for Public Interest Groups on TTIP Trade Negotiations, JAMES LOVE'S BLOG
(May 2, 2013, 9:59 A.M.), http://keionline.org/node/1714.
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public interest groups, outside scholars, and advisors must guess based on hearsay
what the US government negotiating positions are. As a result, many of these actors29
have come to regard the whole process with suspicion. An opportunity to garner
widespread support for TTIP is lost.
30
II. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis in the preceding section identified four main challenges facing the
TTIP agreement in the area of regulatory coherence and cooperation. This section
offers a few ideas and recommendations on how to address each challenge.
A. A Mechanism for Ensuring Action
The first question is the one most urgently advanced by industry. After two
decades of dialogue with meager results, how does TTIP reassure industry that future
efforts at regulatory rationalization will move forward rapidly and with purpose?
As the EU proposal for the horizontal chapter currently contemplates, the two
sides may need to create a central oversight body a Regulatory Cooperation Body
(RCB) to manage the cooperative process, giving it energy and direction.31 The RCB
should include the OIRA on the US side, along with the Commission's Secretary
General on the EU side. Just as clearly, it should include representatives of the
regulatory agencies whose cooperation is desired. The RCB obviously should not strip
regulators of their traditional legal prerogatives to regulate, de-regulate, or recognize
another regulation as equivalent to their own. But it could provide a mechanism for
identifying regulations or guidance documents with substantial transatlantic impact
which merit discussion in the RCB forum. Further, the RCB should be empowered to
set the agenda for transatlantic regulatory cooperation and establish reasonable
timetables for decision. That mandate should come with the understanding that the
regulators on each side reserve the right to make the final decision on the most
appropriate means to protect the public interest.
Once the RCB is created, what is the procedure to be followed for reviewing
agency actions? There are two broad options. The first would permit private actors on
each side to petition their own government, which then would decide whether to
espouse the cause and bring the matter to the RCB. Under the second option, private
actors could petition the RCB directly to request a hearing (which may be a paper
hearing). Either approach would work, and this author has no preference between
them. Indeed, they are not mutually exclusive.
The next question involves the scope of the RCB's jurisdiction. What types of
requests for action may the RCB consider? Should its jurisdiction only extend to
'9 For good examples of this dynamic, see the sources collected in supra note 20.
o While the opacity of the US position has been offset in some measure by the relative clarity of the
EU position hearing one side of a conversation yields some understanding of it even this partial
transparency cannot be sustained much longer. Once talks reach the point where negotiating texts are
merged into a single bracketed draft, the parties will need to decide whether that draft is all public or all
private. At that point, if the USTR position prevails, the talks will enter a black hole that will only heighten
suspicion of the agreement among civil society groups on both sides of the Atlantic.
" See Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP, supra note 9.
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requests by industry for adjustments to new or existing regulations to reduce trade
impacts? Or, should civil society groups and regulatory bodies be empowered to
propose collaboration among regulators in, say, the testing of chemicals or pesticides?
Clearly, broadening the scope of RCB jurisdiction to encompass both trade-enhancing
and regulation-enhancing goals would reassure the public that the goal of the RCB,
and of TTIP, is not just to promote trade but also to make regulators more effective in
carrying out their protective mission.
B. Promoting Sound Decisions While Preserving Autonomy to Disagree
Once the parties have created an RCB with the power to prioritize and energize
(but not control) regulatory cooperation initiatives, the next question is how to ensure
that the RCB process is conducive to sound decision-making. Different interests
approach this question from different perspectives. For industry, sound decisions
would exploit all opportunities for cost-effective regulatory rationalization. For civil
society groups, sound decisions would ensure that the RCB does not become a source
of downward pressure on health, safety, environmental, and consumer financial
protections.
Given these competing priorities and goals, it seems clear that a broad and
balanced array of stakeholders must be involved in shaping regulatory cooperation
decisions. Health, safety, environmental, or financial (HSEF) regulation is
intrinsically complex and requires analyzing large amounts of data, most of which is
in the possession of stakeholders (usually industry). But a process that includes only
industry and regulators is a process ripe for regulatory capture. Whether seeking a
common approach to new regulation or mutual recognition of different existing
requirements, excluding whole categories of stakeholders from the decision-making
process is not an attractive option.
In general, there are three broad procedural approaches for involving stakeholders
in rulemaking having transatlantic significance:
(1) Each bloc makes a unilateral draft decision and then proposes it for public
comment, allowing the other regulator to comment on the proposal at the
same time as the general public;
(2) Regulators on both sides confer with each other privately in the pre-proposal
phase, and seek agreement on a common (or convergent) proposal prior to
issuing either separate or joint proposals. The regulators then issue their
proposal(s) and take comment, jointly or separately, from their respective
publics before reaching a final decision, possibly after further transatlantic
regulator dialogue; or
(3) Regulators on each side confer with each other and with stakeholders either
jointly or separately prior to issuing their proposal or proposals. The
regulators then publish a notice, and take comments on the proposed rule
prior to final action.
The mechanism adopted in the TTIP talks will likely involve, at least implicitly,
some choice among these options. The best option, in this author's judgment is the
third option, because it allows for structured and meaningful stakeholder consultations
2015]
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early in the process, before the agency commits major resources to developing an
approach that later public consultations may reveal as fundamentally flawed. It is also
the option that is most easily integrated into the existing consultative procedures of
both sides.
What happens if, after all this deliberation, the two sides simply cannot agree on
a single regulatory approach, and do not recognize the other side's regulation as
equivalent? Here, the correct answer has already been embraced by TTIP negotiators
on both sides: once the required consultations end, each side will remain free to
cooperate (or not) on that particular issue, and the decision either way will not result
in dispute settlement or sanctions. In other words, the process is mandatory, but the
outcome is voluntary.
Given this position, it may seem odd that civil society groups continue to worry
that the TTIP process will create downward pressure on regulatory protections. One
reason for their concern may be the new requirements for "trade impact assessment"
(TIA) or "regulatory compatibility assessment" (RCA) that have been proposed for
the horizontal chapter of the TTIP Agreement. 3 2 The point of "trade impact
assessment" is to require agencies to assess, before they regulate, not only the costs
and benefits of any proposed regulation, but also its probable trade impact across the
Atlantic.33 For civil society groups, this proposed requirement raises the specter of
"paralysis by analysis" addressed in the next section. It also spawns fears that TIA
will create new pressure points which trade ministries (or regulatory overseers like
OIRA) can use to "persuade" their own regulators to soften for the benefit of
transatlantic trading partners. These concerns are not alleviated by the fact that each
side formally reserves its sovereign right to autonomous decisions. The issue is not
sovereignty, but the internal balance of power among agencies or ministries within the
sovereign.
This may be the most difficult issue to address, conceptually, in the IRC portion
of TTIP. Neither the request for TIA or RCA, nor the concerns outlined above, are
unreasonable. Both sides have a point. However, two considerations may be worth
bearing in mind as these options are weighed.
The first begins with the observation that both regulatory compatibility analysis
(RCA) and trade impact analysis (TIA) have been proposed, but they are somewhat
different concepts. The former is better defined and less threatening to civil society
and public interest values than the latter.
TIA connotes a highly quantitative exercise that focuses narrowly on the expected
impact of a proposed regulation on international trade. A mandate to quantify trade
impacts in addition to other costs and benefits would raise troubling questions of how
trade impacts should be defined in the context of a regulation that is facially non-
discriminatory, how regulators should obtain such information on possible trade
CHASE & PELKMANS, supra note 10, at 17 18.
UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN HIGH LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON JOBS AND GROWTH, FINAL REPORT
4 (2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc 150519.pdf.
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impacts ex ante, and whether trade-based pressures will be used to ratchet down
regulatory effectiveness.
3 4
RCA, by contrast, is a broader concept that allows for a common-sense,
qualitative assessment of both trade impacts and regulatory needs. In this process,
regulators might examine improvements that could streamline or strengthen regulation
while exploring ways to avoid needless regulatory inconsistency.
Significantly, two notable experts on regulatory cooperation Peter Chase, Vice-
President for Europe at the US Chamber of Commerce, and Jacques Pelkmans, Senior
Fellow at the Center for European Policy Studies have endorsed RCA as their
preferred mode of analysis within the TTIP framework. 35 They have also outlined in
broad strokes their view of how RCA might be implemented. Their vision would ask
the initiating regulatory body (Regulator A) to investigate, in the earliest stages of
regulatory development, whether its transatlantic counterpart (Regulator B) already
has a regulation in place to address the same problem. If so, Regulator A would be
required to the determine whether its proposed approach is "compatible with"
Regulator B's. If not, Regulator B would be required to "evaluate the costs and
benefits of adopting a non-compatible approach. 36 This assessment would be made
available for public comment.
The Chase and Pelkmans proposal, though interesting, raises questions that the
authors do not answer about how "regulatory compatibility" would be defined. Much
more work is needed to flesh out the concept before it is possible to determine its
precise contours and utility. However RCA is defined, it seems clear that any
transatlantic dialogue aimed at enhancing regulatory collaboration (including RCA-
focused dialogue) should include: (1) early consultation between sovereigns and (2)
early consultations among sovereigns and stakeholders on both sides. The need for
consultation at some stage is obvious: competent regulation and regulatory impact
assessment require data, and data often resides with stakeholders or with a sovereign
" For an introduction to the conceptual and analytical intricacies of "trade impact assessment," see
Review of the Application of EU and US Regulatory Impact Assessment Guidelines on the Analysis of
Impacts of International Trade and Investment, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2008),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory matterspdf/sg-omb final.pdf. This
Report reveals the conceptual difficulty of defining "trade impact." Annex B2 of this Report examines
several case studies involving US cost-benefit analyses of draft regulations that would affect foreign
producers. But it fails to identify a single case in which a US agency successfully measured a "trade impact"
as distinct from a simple cost of regulation applied to a foreign producer. Id. at 17 25. The report calls for
additional guidance on defining trade impacts, without providing such guidance. Id. at 26. The Obama
Administration's recent guidelines on this point likewise call on US agencies to identify, and consult with
the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) on draft regulations that are reasonably expected to have significant "trade impacts", but without
offering any useful guidance on how a "trade impact" will be measured. See Guidelines on Executive Order
13609, REGULATORY WORKING GROUP 14 (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/eo 13609/eo13609-working-group-
guidelines.pdf. Is "trade impact" simply a cost of compliance experienced by a foreign producer? If so, US
agencies already consider such costs. Or is "trade impact" an actual impact on volume and value of trade,
in which case basic questions arise as to how such impacts are to be forecast ex ante. Clearly, it will be
difficult to justify requiring a detailed analysis of a concept which itself remains poorly defined.
" CHASE & PELKMANS, supra note 10, at 17 18.
36 Id.
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counterparty. As seen above, early consultation is beneficial because it ensures that
input is received when it is most likely to be useful: before the the agency has
committed major resources to developing a "proposal" which it may be quite reluctant
to change. Moreover, because it is much easier and cheaper to alter ideas than
proposals, conferring at the idea stage would allow consideration of more ideas and
alternatives than if public consultations were deferred until proposals were drafted,
thereby improving the odds of the the "right" approach being selected for proposal.
For both these reasons, this author suggests that the initial impact assessments/public
consultations should be held early in the process, at the "idea" stage of regulation.
More specifically, they should come after the identification of alternatives for
regulatory response, but well before the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking.
And they should consist of back-of-the-envelope assessments based on input from
stakeholders received in a structured consultation process, rather than elaborate,
monetized assessments in the style of OIRA-mandated cost-benefit analyses.
C. The Challenge of Finding Resources
However transatlantic regulatory cooperation is structured and implemented, one
thing is certain: it will require resources. This fact itself poses a third, and formidable,
challenge to most US regulatory agencies. Ours, it seems, is an age of both super-
abundance and scarcity. Huge resources flow to sports stadiums and casinos, while
agencies charged with protecting the public interest are perennially starved of both
human and financial resources.
Common sense teaches that in government, as in life, you get what you pay for.
Resource-starved agencies are not going to deliver the smart, consumer-protecting-
yet-trade-promoting regulations that citizens, stakeholders, and negotiators want.
Adding to agencies' fiscal burdens by requiring transatlantic consultations and
additional analysis, on top of the massively under-funded analysis already required of
them, will only make scarcity more acute. Moreover, given the erratic politics of the
US budget and appropriations process, relying on annual appropriations to solve this
resource problem is not an arrangement that inspires confidence.
Faced with this conflict between means and ends, TTIP negotiators should think
creatively. Perhaps they could build into TTIP implementing legislation a dedicated
funding mechanism modeled on the US Superfund or EPA permitting schemes. This
mechanism would both finance and institutionalize the transatlantic cooperation and
public consultation that an effective TTIP agreement will require.
How large would such a fund need to be? I do not have a precise dollar figure to
offer, but given the enormous stakes involved a regulation must cost at least 100
million dollars per year even to be considered economically significant surely the
marginal cost of smarter regulation will be trivial in relation to its net benefits. Simple
common sense suggests investing a few dollars or euros in a process that will save
many more. Indeed, industry stakeholders have privately indicated (to this author) that
say they might support such an arrangement if it were proposed, even though it
involves a fee.
Though the proposal may seem Utopian at first glance, in fact it is neither novel
nor unworkable. On the contrary, the idea has clear precedent on both sides of the
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Atlantic and would be quite easy to implement.37 It seems Utopian in the current
political environment only because the current Congressional leadership is so
ideologically opposed to the very idea of regulation. It is thus unlikely to establish a
funding source dedicated to supporting heightened regulatory analysis, even for the
purpose of reducing unnecessary obstacles to trade.
Such an attitude is unfortunate, and ultimately self-defeating. Conservative critics
of regulation should reflect upon the fact that inept regulation is always cheaper to put
in place than smart regulation. For example, the simple edict "thou shalt not pollute"
does not require much regulatory analysis, but no rational regulator or stakeholder
would replace the nuanced laws and regulations that now exist with such a simple but
draconian rule. Smart regulation seeks the most cost-effective strategy for maximizing
benefit in relation to the burden on jobs and growth. It can save millions or even
billions of dollars over the medium to longer term, but it inevitably drains agency
resources in the short-term. Investing in smart regulation-and in a broad-based
consultative process to achieve it is a wise choice even for, especially for,
conservative policymakers. In short, funding smart transnational regulatory
cooperation with a dedicated user fee would not cost industry much, and would pay
for itself many times over in the enhanced protection of citizens, while promoting jobs
and growth.
D. The Transparency Challenge
As seen in Section I.D. above, the EU and the US have followed different
approaches to transparency in TTIP negotiations. The EU has chosen the path of
openness while the US, to date, has followed the path of secrecy. The US approach
presents a singular anomaly. On one hand, it professes devotion to increasing the
transparency of regulation on both sides. Yet it insists on working towards this through
a negotiating process that is almost entirely secret, except to a handful of cleared
advisors who are themselves bound to secrecy. This secrecy offers the public no
opportunity for informed comment on the US proposals in specific fields.
What motivates this strange US position? It is at odds with the fundamental
commitment to openness that President Obama announced at the outset of his
administration.38 Moreover, the administration has offered no explanation of its
aversion to transparency in the TTIP proceedings. Based on my experience as a former
Assistant General Counsel at the USTR, I suspect the reasoning may track the
following syllogism: trade negotiations, like most foreign policy dialogues, require
confidentiality. TTIP regulatory cooperation talks are trade negotiations. Ergo, TTIP
regulatory cooperation talks should be confidential.
17 See, e.g., Prescription Drug User Fee Act § 103, 21 U.S.C. § 379(h) (2013) (empowering the US
Food and Drug Administration to levy a fee to cover agency costs of reviewing human drug applications);
see also Funding, EUR. MEDICINES AGENCY,
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl pages/about us/general/general content 000130.jsp&mid
WC0b01ac0580029336 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (noting that the European Medicines Agency receives
277 million euros in fees and charges levied for regulatory services, charged to the European pharmaceutical
industry).
" See Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
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If this is the reasoning, it harbors a modicum of truth. Traditional trade
negotiations seek tit-for-tat agreements to reduce tariffs or import quotas. When
governments agree to trade US tariff concessions on cotton shirts for Chinese tariff
reductions on semiconductors, they do not necessarily want the cotton industry in the
room. They also do not want to circulate publicly a piece of paper that proposes such
a trade-off. Governments prefer to cut traditional trade deals in private, then roll out
the package publicly at the end of the day. Their hope is that the winners will outshout
the losers in deliberations preceding the ensuing up-or-down vote on trade agreements
to which Trade Promotion Authority applies.
39
If this is the reasoning, it is certainly understandable in the context of traditional
trade negotiations. However, the USTR errs in assuming that every aspect of every
trade negotiation must be governed by the same rules of procedure. In fact, talks on
regulatory cooperation are a quite different species of diplomacy than traditional trade
negotiations. Regulatory cooperation talks are not tit-for-tat negotiations aimed at
picking winners and losers in the hope that wins will outweigh losses and winners
outshout losers at the end of the day. They are problem-solving exercises aimed at
finding win-win outcomes based on highly technical data that is most often in the
hands of private parties. Regulatory cooperation talks do involve foreign governments,
but they also involve, centrally, the domestic regulatory processes of both parties.
Those domestic regulatory processes are, and ought to remain, transparent. If secrecy
is the norm in foreign policy, then openness is the norm in domestic policy. The goal
of TTIP, ironically, is to make those domestic processes even more open.
So why not simply re-conceptualize the TTIP IRC negotiating process? Instead
of regarding IRC talks as an extension of foreign policy with a built-in presumption
of secrecy, view them an extension of domestic policy where publishing and seeking
comment on proposals is the norm. The EU has already shown that this can be done,
and how to do it. All that remains is for the US to follow suit. The result will be a
better agreement, with broader support from the public.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined four challenges confronting TTIP negotiators as they
attempt to build a framework of regulatory cooperation that surpasses anything yet
attempted in a trade agreement. After reviewing these challenges, we considered
recommendations on how to meet each challenge. The task will not be easy but the
prize at the end of the day could be significant: huge savings for industry and
consumers, achieved within a cooperative regulatory framework that preserves and
enhances health, safety, environmental, and financial protections on both sides.
'9 See Trade Promotion Authority, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https:Hustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-promotion-authority (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
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